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lous claims for precipitation and runoff, the court remanded the case
to the water court for a determination of these fees.
DonaldE. Frick
Trail's End Ranch, LLC v. Colo. Div. of Water Res., 91 P.3d 1058
(Colo. 2004) (holding the practice of diverting water from points not
decreed to a water right amounts to a change in the right that cannot
enjoy the priority of the existing decree without first following the requirement of adjudication).
Trail's End Ranch, LLC, ("Trail's End") brought suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Colorado Division of
Water Resources ("Division"). The District Court, Water Division 2,
granted the Division's motion for summary judgment and Trail's End
appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Trail's End held three decreed water rights for irrigation at separate ditches on Spruce Creek. Trail's End diverted water associated
with these rights not only at the decreed headgates, but also at points
downstream. When the Division Engineer issued an order to cease this
practice, Trail's End complied. However, Trail's End subsequently
proposed to the Division Engineer a plan to operate these rights by
diverting the associated water at the decreed headgates, measuring it,
and then returning it into Spruce Creek. The water then flowed downstream to points where Trail's End would recapture and use it for irrigation. Although this proposed practice occurred entirely on the
property of Trail's End and there were no other water users between
the headgates and the downstream points of diversion, the Division
Engineer found the practice objectionable and rejected the proposal.
When the State Engineer agreed that the practice was unacceptable,
Trail's End filed an action in the water court to declare its entitlement
to the proposed operations and to enjoin enforcement of the Division
Engineer's order.
The water court held that Trail's End's practice resulted in a
change of its decreed points of diversion and that the plan to convey
and recapture the same water did not exempt Trail's End from applying for a change of water right as prescribed by statute. The water
court granted the Division's motion for summary judgment and denied
the similar motion filed by Trail's End. Following this decision, Trail's
End appealed directly to the Colorado Supreme Court.
In addressing the appeal, the supreme court first recognized that
the legislatively created process of adjudication makes water rights enforceable. An absolute decree from such adjudication confirms a water
right holder's vested property interest in the use of a specified amount
of water, when the right holder obtains it through decreed points of
diversion and applies it to a particular beneficial use. Incident to this
right is the right to change the point of diversion to the extent it nei-
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ther enlarges the right or nor injures other water users. However, such
a change in the point of diversion constitutes a change in the water
right itself, which requires application and adjudication similar to an
initial determination of a water right. Considering the meaning of
terms used in the applicable statutory provisions, the court concluded
that diverting water from a natural stream at a point other than that
decreed to the water right was an out-of-priority diversion. This justifies an order from the Division to cease further diversions as to protect
other existing adjudicated water rights.
The court then applied this statutory scheme to the proposed practice of Trail's End. The court found that the plan to recapture diverted water returned into Spruce Creek below the headgates, constituted a change in point of diversion, regardless of the other measures
taken. As such, Trail's End could not benefit from the priorities of the
existing water rights without first adjudicating the change of those
rights. Although Colorado law permits water right holders to use natural streams to convey water when measured in accordance with the
dictates of the State Engineer, this allowance does not relieve the water
right holder from resulting legal obligations. The required adjudicative process played a critical role in the administration of water right
changes as it protected potentially-affected decreed water rights and
prevented the enlargement of appropriations by quantifying and establishing an appropriation's historic beneficial consumptive use before
approving any proposed change. In light of this, the court found no
legitimate purpose for the proposed rerouting practice of Trail's End
existed, other than to circumvent the statutory requirement to adjudicate a change of water right, which undermines this important protection for other decreed rights.
Having found that the proposed practice resulted in a new or
changed diversion, the court concluded that Trail's End could not
benefit from the priorities of its existing water rights without adjudicating the resulting changes in those rights in the manner prescribed by
statute. Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the
water court granting the Division's motion for summaryjudgment.
Mark D. Shea
GEORGIA
Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 278 Ga. 740 (2004) (holding a nonlicensee party challenging the validity of a discharge permit has the
burden of proof of showing impropriety).
The Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department
of Natural Resources ("EPD") issued Gwinnett County a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit ("permit") to discharge
treated wastewater into Lake Lanier on November 9, 2000. Terence D.
Hughey and others appealed the issuance of the permit, and Gwinnett

